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Development economics and competition: a parallel 
intellectual history 
 
Ioannis Lianos, Abel Mateus and Azza Raslan1 
 
I. Introduction 
 
 Competition law was born and framed in the developed nations of the 
West. The economic thinking it has relied upon  - referred to hereinafter for 
convenience purposes as “competition economics” – is based in industrial 
organization, a sub-discipline of neoclassical price theory. Despite the 
existence of various “schools” and intellectual traditions, neoclassical price 
theory emphasizes the importance of markets and is classified in the micro-
economic, as opposed to the macro-economic, “field” of economic thought.2 
As such, competition economics focuses on markets, not economies, the 
latter depending on a broader series of variables, such as the rate of wages 
paid, the demand and supply for all goods, the supply of money in society, 
rather than the interplay of supply and demand in a specific product market. 
Competition economics also assumes that there is in fact a market economy 
with some competition. Development economics, on the contrary, has 
historically been associated with macro-economics, although as we will 
examine further, the strict dichotomy between macro-economics and micro-
economics is a false dichotomy. Established as a distinct field of economics in 
the post-World War II period, development economics sought to provide 
policy prescriptions for developed world and multilateral aid providers in the 
provision of assistance to impoverished countries that were not part of the 
communist block, then called the “third world,” and referred to now as 
developing countries.  
Studying the interaction between competition law and development 
economics might seem counterintuitive, as both fields grew and evolved in 
relative ignorance of each other.  For a long time, each field addressed 
different questions. As of the 1990s, however, this is no longer true because 
of the spread of competition law to a number of developing countries. 
Developing countries now form the majority of jurisdictions that have enacted 
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competition law statutes.3 Recent competition law and economics scholarship 
has also made important inroads towards examining how the broader 
characteristics of an economy might affect the type of competition law regime 
it should enforce.4 Industrial Organization economists have recently modeled 
the channels of interaction between innovation and economy, showing the 
importance of competition for productivity growth. Empirical research has also 
largely confirmed the importance of competition for efficiency. Development 
economists’ interest in competition law and its interaction with development 
and growth is also on the rise.5  
This chapter aims to contribute to the cross-fertilization of the fields of 
competition economics and development economics. For that to happen, 
however, it is important to focus on the complex intellectual history that placed 
these different groups of scholars,  and the conceptual traditions they 
represent, in different intellectual itineraries in order to provide an explanation 
to the relative isolation of each field from the inputs of the other. Our narrative 
will be the opposition between the dominant intellectual tradition in 
development economics until recently, which highlighted the role of state 
intervention through the establishment of protectionist barriers and 
monopolies to the expense of markets and free competition, and the 
competition economics’ belief on the superior efficiency of free competition. 
Our aim is not to be exhaustive, but to sketch the intellectual history of this 
opposition and to explain why the recent evolution of both fields to the 
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analysis of the micro-foundations of growth, their focus on institutions and 
their emphasis on empirical methods, might lead to a new synthesis, favoring 
a useful cross-fertilization between competition economics and development 
economics.6  
 
II. Tales of Economic Development and Competition in Early Economic 
Thought: Intellectual Premises and Implications 
 
One can classify these various intellectual traditions evolving into 
maturity in the 19th century and first half of the 20th century in two broad 
categories: those emphasizing the efficiency of markets and competition (the 
efficient markets paradigm) and those doubting, in various degrees, their 
efficiency (the inefficient markets paradigm) 
 
A. Economic Development and the Efficient Markets Paradigm  
 
Classical economics did not address economic development per se.7 
However, the purpose for classical economists was to achieve “material 
progress” or “economic progress”.8 Adam Smith was the first widely 
recognized economist to refer to the role of markets for economic 
development. Smith’s ingredients for a theory of growth were that growth 
depends on productivity, labor and capital. Smith characterized the increase 
in productivity as the interaction of the division of labor and market expansion.  
The new microeconomics of development, building on network models, 
has shown the central role of the mechanism discovered by Adam Smith 
regarding the link between labor division and market dimension and the 
importance of multiplication of markets for growth.9 The process of 
development is characterized by specialization and productivity increases 
associated with the division of labor, which is only possible with market 
expansion and multiplication. In this model, comparative advantages are thus 
generated endogenously through the process of specialization, the preference 
of individuals for diversity and a decrease in transaction costs. The main 
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lesson to take away from this literature is that economic growth occurs 
because markets multiply. It is not due to a population increase, exogenous 
changes in the transaction, production and preferences. Rather, growth is 
generated by the interaction of the division of labor and market building.  
Other classical economists supported free trade (internal and 
international trade) and specialization as a means for development.10 Free 
trade increases competition and thus reduces the monopolistic rents enjoyed 
by the incumbent firms. Ricardo demonstrated that under conditions of free 
trade, a country would specialize in the production and export of commodities 
that it can produce at a lower production cost compared to other countries. 
Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory is still the main argument for free 
trade.11 However, it is built on assumptions that are not always present, 
especially in the case of developing countries.12 Rodrik argues that the 
assumption that specialization raises overall productivity in an economy that is 
open to trade is misguided.  Instead, he argues that comparative advantage is 
not the sole “driving force” for economic development. 13 He explains that the 
“trick” is not to focus solely on the one product you do best but to specialize 
and master the production of a broader range of activities. Accordingly, 
achieving economic efficiency is not just a question of specialization, but also 
a question of what to specialize in. Thus, it is dynamic comparative advantage 
and not static comparative advantage that a country should pursue. 
This emphasis on the dynamic element was lost in the effort of 
neoclassical economists, on which competition economics is largely based, to 
address, primarily, issues of static allocation of given resources at a given 
period of time. Starting with Jevons and the marginal revolution, neoclassical 
price theorists took as a given the level of population, the various needs and 
capacities of production, land and other resources, to concentrate on the 
mode of employing labor that would maximize utility. As Meiers explains it, 
“(f)ocusing on the search for the conditions of efficiency in utilizing existing 
resources in the economy, economists totally ignored economic growth as a 
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policy objective for several decades, from about 1870s to 1930s.”14 Indeed, 
“(e)conomic analysis concentrated on the conditions that would make possible 
various optima rather than on the conditions that would allow an economy to 
achieve ever-changing optima of ever-increasing range”15. Their concern was 
how consumer choice could be maximized (allocative efficiency) or 
producers’s costs minimized (productive efficiency). In their standard model, 
interactions between producers and consumers are mediated through the 
price system, thus leading to a unique Pareto efficient equilibrium. If 
neoclassical price theorists examined interrelationships between different 
sectors of the economy, their analysis focused on a particularly short time 
horizon and the impersonal setting of a market for all goods and all periods. 
History and institutions did not matter and could not influence the choice of 
the equilibrium and were thus excluded from the analysis. The possibility that 
there can be multiple equilibria, inferior or superior, at a given point in time, 
which could be chosen because of historical, cultural, or institutional reasons 
or the distribution of wealth, was not seriously contemplated.16 
This period coincided with the dominance of neoclassical price theory 
and welfare economics in the economics profession, which became the 
mainstream in the 1890s. This occurred after Alfred Marshall resolved the 
conflict between the utility and cost theories of value by elaborating a theory 
(partial equilibrium) which included both the cost of production (the supply 
curve) and the utility theories (the demand curve).. Under this theroy 
equilibrium involves not only the most satisfactory position for each individual 
in the economic system, but also the elimination of any above normal profits. 
The static approach thus advanced allowed for clear predictions on the forces 
pulling toward equilibrium, an important weapon in the professionalization of 
the economics discipline during the late 19th century and the subsequent 
increased role of economists.  
The Walrasian general equilibrium theory, formalized by Arrow and 
Debreu in the 1950s,17 assumes complete/universal markets for all current 
and future contingent commodities and perfect information (first fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics). According to this theorem, every perfectly 
competitive economy in a state of general equilibrium is Pareto-optimal. 
Wealth distribution is not a concern, as it is assumed that any Pareto-optimal 
allocation of resources can be achieved by means of perfectly competitive 
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equilibrium, once one makes an appropriate redistribution of initial 
endowments (the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics). 
Reinforced by the Coase theorem, which advanced that private bargaining 
might provide a solution to an inefficient redistribution of initial endowments in 
the absence of transaction costs,18 the general equilibrium theory (as well as 
partial equilibrium theory) glorifies the concept of perfect competition and 
confined the role of government to lump-sum redistributive measures.19 The 
fact that partial equilibrium theory serves as the foundations of modern 
competition economics’ analysis may explain why growth has never been an 
explicit aim of competition law and policy. 
 Schumpeter’s theory of economic development attempted to break 
away from the concept of static equilibrium. Schumpeter criticizes the “circular 
flow of economic life as conditioned by given circumstances” approach, 
focusing instead on the process of economic change20. According to 
Schumpeter, economic development comes from within the economic system 
and is not merely an adaptation to external factors. It occurs discontinuously, 
thus disrupting any equilibrium that might be attained. Discontinuous bursts of 
innovative investment by the entrepreneurs constitute the central autonomous 
cause of economic development. In this dynamic context, above normal 
profits provide reward to innovation, thus leading to surplus values that cannot 
be present in perfect equilibrium conditions. As Schumpeter observes, 
“(d)evelopment […] is a distinct phenomenon, entirely foreign to what may be 
observed in the circular flow or in the tendency towards equilibrium.”21 The 
role of consumers in the process of economic change is secondary, in 
contrast to the important role producers play in “educating” the consumers to 
want new things.22 In the words of Schumpeter, “while it is permissible and 
even necessary to consider consumers’ wants as an independent and indeed 
the fundamental force in a theory of the circular flow, we must take a different 
attitude as soon as we analyze change.”23This emphasis on the dynamic 
aspects of change, the recognition of the primordial role of the entrepreneur, 
and the neglect of consumer surplus, might appear in direct conflict to the 
neoclassical price theory’s focus on static consumer surplus and competition 
law’s traditional preoccupation with consumer choice. 
 
B. Economic Development and the Inefficient Markets Paradigm 
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 Contrary to classical and neo-classical economics, which assumed the 
superiority of the market system for the efficient allocation of resources in 
society, a set of economic theories emerged and evolved during the 19th 
century and early 20th century, emphasizing, to various degrees, the 
inefficiency of the market mechanism, either to achieve the static efficiency 
aims favored by neoclassical price theory or the objective of economic growth. 
The common thread of these movements consists in advancing reasons for a 
more active state intervention in markets. From this perspective, and 
depending on the degree and methods of State intervention advocated, they 
challenge competition economics’ belief that, absent market imperfections, 
the market provides the most efficient mechanism for the organization of 
economic transactions. 
 
1. The Infant Industry Argument 
 
 Industrialization has always been at the heart of any discussion on 
development. According to the “infant industry” argument, a country should 
have productive power by first strengthening its infant industries to level the 
playing field before opening its doors to free trade and competition24. In his 
famous statement supporting the case for infant industry protection, John 
Stuart Mill25 alluded to one of the main prerequisites for such industries: the 
presence of dynamic learning effects that are external to firms. However, 
protection should be temporary as long as the infant industry matures and 
becomes viable without protection. Subsequently, Charles Francis Bastable 
added another condition requiring that the cumulative net benefits provided by 
the protected industry exceed the cumulative costs of protection.26 Together, 
these conditions are known as the Mill–Bastable Test.27 
Almost all arguments for infant industries boil down to production costs 
for newly established industries within a country being likely to be initially 
higher than for well-established foreign producers of the same product, who 
have greater experience, higher knowledge and higher skill levels. Over time, 
new domestic producers would raise their productivity and be able to compete 
with foreign firms on equal footing. One should note that this argument is for 
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temporary support of the domestic industry through the suppression of 
competition, Although one common mechanism for competition suppression is 
trade protection, the modern theory of “second best”28 proffers that a producer 
subsidy is superior to a more distorting tariff, unless the government is 
constrained to raise revenue or taxes are also distorting. Regardless of the 
means of suppression, there are various arguments advanced by the 
supporters of the “infant industry” argument for a more active state 
intervention.  
First it is considered important to induce investment in the acquisition 
of technological knowledge such as learning-by-doing and on-the-job-training, 
which create externalities that are internalized by the firm. Learning effects 
are crucial in most industries.29  
Second, state intervention may also produce externalities externalities 
exterior to the firm but interior to the industry. In this case, the effects of the 
activity of one firm benefit the others and cannot be appropriated completely 
by that firm. Externalities generated by the accumulation of knowledge due to 
R&D are of this type. When spillovers occur to other firms, it leads to a 
situation of under-provision of the external good. Spillovers may not be purely 
national and may also have an international impact. The case for government 
intervention through a subsidy in these cases is well established. A learning-
by-doing effect with external impact to the firm is also a case for output 
subsidies provided by the state. A tariff is again a second best option because 
it introduces an unnecessary consumer distortion. If investment in human 
capital is required for an increase in productivity, then the firm or the workers 
should be able to borrow. Only if there are imperfections in the capital markets 
will this solution not work. However, output subsidies also do not solve the 
appropriability problem of externalities.  
Third, there is ample empirical evidence in support of the assertion that 
R&D generates high rates of return and that the social rate is much larger 
than the private rate.30 Problems of coordination and imperfect markets or 
lack of perfect information lead to the well-known case of underinvestment. 
Let us suppose that there are significant fixed costs and export demand is 
                       
28
 R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 
11 (1956).  
29
 Martin B. Zimmerman, Learning Effects and the Commercialization of New Energy 
Technologies: The Case of Nuclear Power, 13 BELL J. ECON. 297 (1982); Marvin B. 
Lieberman, The Learning Curve and Pricing in the Chemical Processing Industries, 15 RAND 
J. ECON. 213 (1983); M. Bell., B. Ross-Larson & L. Westphal, Assessing the Performance of 
Infant Industries, 16 J. DEV. ECON. 101 (1984). 
30
 Timothy F. Bresnahan, Measuring the Spillovers from Technical Advance: Mainframe 
Computers in Financial Services, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 742 (1986); Manuel Trajtenberg, The 
Welfare Analysis of Product Innovations, With an Application to Computed Tomography 
Scanners, 97 J. POL. ECON. 444 (1989); Jeffrey I. Bernstein & M. Ishaq Nadiri, Interindustry 
R&D, Rates of Return, and Production in High-Tech Industries (C.V. Starr Ctr. for Applied 
Econ., Econ. Research Reports, 1988), available at 
http://www.econ.nyu.edu/cvstarr/working/1988/RR88-04.pdf. 
11 
 
limited due to high transportation costs or barriers to trade abroad. Profitable 
entry by a producer may be precluded by the non-existence of a buyer 
downstream in the market. The same reasoning may apply to a firm that 
needs inputs upstream in the market to enter into production. and may also 
apply to network externalities that arise due to either technological or 
pecuniary linkages. These coordination failures may be a reason to establish 
a tariff in order to temporarily raise profitability in the market. However, it is 
doubtful that a tariff will solve the coordination problem. A superior policy 
would be some form of centralized system of information, a role usually 
performed by financial institutions, or sector or regional planning. 
Fourth, an additional problem justifying intervention arises from 
imperfect capital markets that either do not finance the investments required 
or, due to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, require collateral 
that would penalize small firms and market entry. There is no ready solution 
and besides, government intervention requires both ex ante and ex post 
knowledge of rates of return which are difficult to estimate. 
Fifth, a further case for government intervention is linked to the need to 
build a reputation in export markets. Consumers have imperfect information 
and it is costly for them to discover the quality of a new firm. As a result, it is 
costlyto build a reputation, leading some economists to advance the need for 
an export subsidy to help in the penetration of new markets. However, there is 
a serious signaling problem with this approach: oftentimes quality is 
associated with the intrinsic characteristics of products, and some firms have 
higher quality products because they are better at producing those goods. As 
explained by Grossman and Horn31, in order to get the subsidy, every firm will 
have to degrade the quality of its product. The best policies are the ones that 
give an incentive for firms to produce differential improvements in the quality 
of their products, like minimum standards and enforcing warranties. 
We know that in perfect equilibrium markets, intervention is almost 
never an optimal policy. As we saw above, within a monopoly market 
structure there is an argument for government intervention, which is not 
surprising, since monopoly is already a source of market distortion. Is there a 
case for government intervention in intermediate structures of imperfect 
competition like an oligopoly? This is a more complex world. 
Theoretical and empirical evidence shows that the strongest case for 
government intervention may arise in the first stages of introduction of a new 
innovative product, both in developed and developing countries. For 
developed countries it is in terms of R&D and for developing countries in 
terms of learning-by-doing. In both cases, spillover effects are very important 
and it may be difficult for private firms to appropriate all the benefits of their 
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actions. But it should be recognized that protection comes only as a second or 
even a third best policy option. Subsidies or tax benefits to R&D and the 
process of learning are more adequate.  
Models of endogenous growth based on the introduction of new 
varieties or new products are important to understand how diffusion of 
technological innovation takes place around the world.32 Technological 
transfer from the North to the South is crucial for the development of the 
South, and the technological development of the South is based on imitation 
of the inventions/innovations that take place in the North. While a stricter 
policy of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the North may benefit R&D and 
monopoly rents in this region, it will prevent faster imitation by the South, 
unless imitation is only done by multinationals of the North located in the 
South. If the first effect predominates, stricter IPRs can lead to a decrease of 
wages in the South. This is another element to consider in the definition, for 
example, of the optimal duration of a patent. But a lax policy of IPRs in the 
South can also prevent development of technologies adapted to the 
economies of the South. This can have implications on the adequate 
competition law-intellectual property interaction, which might not be the same 
for developing and developed jurisdictions. 
There is still a scarcity of rigorous studies on the relevance and effects 
of protection for infant industries, despite its wide use by developing countries. 
As we saw it is only generally a third best policy and should always be 
temporary, but the difficulty in practice is to identify what industries to target 
as in industrial policy. What can never go wrong are policies for human capital 
accumulation and building necessary infrastructure.  
 
 
2. Marxist Approaches 
 
In his book “Capital”, co-authored with Friedrich Engels,33 Karl Marx 
introduced a linear growth model: the stages of growth.34 Based on a 
historical analysis, Marx advanced the view that capitalism constitutes one of 
the stages on the road to economic development before the society evolves to 
socialism.35 He put forward the labor theory of value: that the labor factor of 
                       
32
 For a survey see Gino Gancia & Fabricio Zilibotti, Horizontal Innovation in the Theory of 
Growth and Development, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (Philippe Aghion and Steven 
Durlauf eds., 1995). 
33
 KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Penguin Classics 1992) (1867). 
34
 Although Karl Marx is usually grouped with classical economics, we have included him in 
this part since he was one of the few early economists who presented a unique linear growth 
path, which also influenced the thinking of later developmental economists under the Neo 
Marxists school. 
35
 See KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, supra note 32, at Part I, 
Chapter I; JOAN ROBINSON, AN ESSAY ON MARXIAN ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1966). 
13 
 
production rather than market forces (the exchange value of the commodity 
as represented by its price on the market) are the source of the value of a 
commodity.36 But his theory of value should be understood as a normative 
(ideological) theory, when confronted with market prices.Pranah Bardhan 
notes that “development economics is the only major branch of economics 
where elements of Marxist and Marx-inspired ideas have had a significant 
impact on the mainstream.”37 The influence of Marxist economic thought on 
development economics resumes in the following two issues: (i) the 
introduction of the idea of unequal exchange and (ii) the emphasis on 
structural constraints (i.e. historical and social norms, wealth) that provide little 
scope to some actors for freedom of action or rational choice. A common 
feature of Marxist and neo-Marxist economic thought on development is 
indeed the realization that relationships of voluntary economic exchange 
between developed and developing countries (the center and the periphery) 
do not lead to a situation of mutual advantage, as was argued by the classical 
liberal economists in conformity to the precepts of the theory of comparative 
advantage. Rather, as was shown by historical experience, these 
relationships led merely to the alleged continuous transfer of value from the 
capital-poor periphery producing commodities to the capital-rich center38, 
although this proposition was not theoretically proved.  This effect was 
intensified by the international division of labor between societies focusing on 
agricultural and mineral (primary) products and industrialized countries, a by-
product of the colonial system.39 These propositions would be taken by the 
structuralist/institutionalist school in Latin America of the 1950s.  
The structural constraints resulting from this asymmetry between rich 
jurisdictions, able to maximize the results of the competitive process, and poor 
agricultural periphery, may take different forms, such as the existence of 
institutional traps (inefficient institutions or social norms that it is impossible to 
reform) or the persistence of production relations perpetuating mass poverty 
in the periphery (i.e. imposed by multi-national companies). These structural 
constraints are mirrored in the socio-economic and political framework of 
these jurisdictions, differentiating them as a separate category from the 
developed center. The concept of a developing (or under-developed) country 
is thus born. Development economists inspired by Marxism advanced an 
active state intervention and the regulation of multi-national companies as the 
means through which industrialization, and thus modernization, would occur. 
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Marxists differed, however, from neo-Marxists in their conception of the type 
of economics needed for these nations, the first advancing a monoeconomics 
claim that perceives development as a linear evolution from a pre-capitalist 
society to a capitalist one, and finally to socialism, the second rejecting 
monoeconomics and advancing different strategies on the need to 
industrialize under-developed nations.40 
 
3. Neoclassical Price Theory and Market Failures 
 
Neoclassical price theory is characterized by being micro-oriented, 
focusing on the utility-maximizing behavior of individuals and the profit-
maximizing actions of perfectly competitive firms, with the main concern being 
the “static allocation of resources” and “not the dynamic growth of an entire 
economy.”41 Traditionally, neoclassical economics presumed that people act 
rationally, the bases of their choice being the maximization of utility for 
individuals and that of profits for firms. These choices are made 
independently, under conditions of perfect information. However, these 
assumptions are obviously unreal for many markets, which are characterized 
by the presence of market failures. Hence, markets left to operate alone will 
not always result in efficient allocation of goods and services. Market failure 
may be attributed to many factors, such as information asymmetries, failure to 
supply public goods, imperfect competition or monopolistic competition. And 
markets that are taken for granted in developed countries may simply not 
exist in developing countries.42  
Starting with Marshall, neoclassical economists altered their view on 
the ability of government to intervene efficiently in the marketplace and the 
importance of consumer surplus.43  The trend was intensified at the turn of the 
20th century with Sidwick,44 and more importantly by Pigou.45 Pigou’s main 
contribution to welfare economics was the theory of market failures that 
extended beyond Marshall’s focus on consumer surplus.46 Pigou challenged 
the prior belief of classical and neo-classical economists on the ability of the 
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free play of self interest to serve the public interest, which formed the 
intellectual underpinning of the laissez-faire policy prescriptions prevailing 
until the 1930s. The “imperfect competition” and “monopolistic competition” 
theories advanced by Robinson and Chamberlin in the early 1930s further 
reinforced the view that the perfect competition paradigm was unrealistic.47 
Taking as a given that the aim of sound economic policy is to increase 
the “national dividend”, which measures the value of the output of the 
community, Pigou highlighted the existence of various instances where there 
are divergences between the private and social net products, because of 
market failures such as externalities and, more generally, the existence of 
spillovers.48 He concluded that “certain specific acts of interference with 
normal economic processes may be expected not to diminish but to increase 
the dividend,”49 thus challenging the sharp dichotomy between state 
intervention and the efficiency of markets that prevailed at the time. The 
establishment of economically sophisticated regulatory regimes in specific 
industries (i.e. airlines, telecoms, energy) in the post war period, at  the 
expense of softer forms of regulation such as competition law, relied upon 
Pigou’s theory of market failure. Ronald Coase and the Chicago school 
heavily criticized his prescriptions,50 thus marking the beginning of a separate 
tradition in welfare economics, more inimical to state intervention.  
 
4. Keynesian Approaches 
  
A basic tenet of neoclassical price theory is that, absent a market 
failure, markets will work efficiently in the long run. Failures like the Great 
Depression were not contemplated.  In contrast, Keynesian economics in the 
1930s addressed questions of “depression equilibrium and mass 
unemployment” and advanced “a strategic regulative role for the state.”51 
Keynes was particularly concerned with the unemployment of labor and the 
underutilization of capital during depression in advanced industrial countries 
as a result of over-saving. Keynes’s remedy to unemployment was to increase 
aggregate demand through fiscal policies.52 Keynesian economics thus led to 
a relative neglect of the price mechanism and the micro-economic foundations 
which were crucial for welfare economics.53 Central government intervention 
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was thus necessary in order to approach full-employment equilibrium. This 
argument, along with market failure theories, paved the way for a more active 
role for the state and legitimized interventionist policies in the 1930s.  
Although not concerned with developing countries as such, Keynes 
exercised an indirect intellectual influence on development economics, as 
manifested by the Harod-Domar growth models, which were used as the 
basis for planning models for developing countries following World War II.54 
Harod and Domar found that growth is proportional to the share of investment 
spending as a proportion of national income, thus extending the static 
employment analysis of Keynes. The growth rate of national income is thus 
inversely related to the capital-output ratio. Although the Harod-Domar model 
was not concerned with under-developed countries, and was initially 
formulated with the aim of addressing issues of chronic unemployment in 
industrialized countries following the Depression, one of its implications, as 
we will discuss in the next part, was that the principal strategies of 
development were thought to be the mobilization of domestic and foreign 
savings in order to generate sufficient investment that would accelerate 
economic growth. These models, the so-called two-gap models, were 
extensively used by international organizations in the 1960s and 1970s to 
determine the need of foreign exchange (aid) required to achieve a given 
growth rate by the developing country. 
 
 
III. The Battle for the Soul of Development Economics 
 
 We can distinguish a first phase in development economics, during the 
1950s and 1960s, as being dominated by interventionism, i.e. state 
intervention, followed by a second phase: the return to the free market 
paradigm in the 1970s-1980s. Finally, in the third phase starting in the 1990s, 
the emphasis shifted to institutional design. 55 The following part will address 
these three phases of development economics. Our claim is that while the first 
phase marked the departure of development economics from the neoclassical 
price theory framework that forms the theoretical backbone of welfare 
economics, in particular competition economics, the second phase was 
characterized by important ideological debates and tensions that led to a 
progressive embracement of the market/competition paradigm by 
development economics. The common focus on institutions during the third 
phase, offers a real chance for a useful interaction between development 
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economics and competition economics that corresponds to the evolving aims 
of competition law. 
 
A. Development Economics as an Alternative to Mono-Economics 
 
In the early post-World War II era, development economists 
contemplated that capital accumulation and technical progress were the main 
driving forces behind development. Development economists did not share 
the neoclassical economists’ beliefs about the price system and markets in 
general, at least for developing economies. As Gerald M. Meier notes: 
“(t)he price system in the less developed country existed in only a 
rudimentary form: markets were fragmented and localized; market 
imperfections were pervasive; and there was little range for the 
sophisticated exercise of the logic of choice as in a well- defined price 
system. Moreover, large changes in the economy were the very 
essence of development – not the incremental or marginal changes of 
neoclassical economics. Substantial transformation in the structure of 
the economy was needed. A widening of the economy was required – 
not simply the tightening up of the economy through the application of 
neoclassical principles of resource allocation.”56 
 Under the influence of the Harod-Domar model, the major obstacle to 
be overcome was thought to be capital deficiency: “it was necessary to fill the 
savings gap and to foster technical progress.”57 The solution suggested to this 
problem was foreign aid for planned investment and the adoption of import-
substitution industrialization policies that would rely on central planning. 
Development would thus be achieved through the promotion of both private 
and public investments.  
The theoretical underpinning of these theories was the “dual sector” 
model suggested by Arthur Lewis in 1954.58 Lewis argued that “the central 
problem of economic development is to understand the process by which a 
community which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 percent of its 
national income or less converts itself into an economy where voluntary 
saving is running at about 12 to 15 percent of national income or more.”59 His 
suggestion was that under-developed nations were characterized by the 
presence of two economies: a high productivity one with high wages and a 
low productivity one with low wages but surplus labor (essentially laborers, 
self-subsistence farmers, domestic services workers, small retailers). Capital 
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accumulation will lead to the gradual transfer of these labor resources from 
the subsistence sector to the high productivity one, as long as capital 
accumulation catches up with the surplus labor. The process relies on the 
assumption that, joined with capital, labor produces an output larger than its 
wage, thus generating a capitalist surplus which is later reinvested in order to 
create new capital. Growth is largely dependent on the increase of the share 
of the capitalist sector in national income. 
In “The Stages of Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto,” Rostow also 
highlighted the crucial role played by investment in presenting his linear-
stages-of-growth model as a road map for development.60 Drawing on the 
historical example of Great Britain, Rostow identified the following five stages 
of economic development: traditional, transitional, take-off, maturity and high 
mass consumption. This evolutionary and linear path to growth was 
universally applicable (to both industrialized and non-industrialised countries). 
Development was perceived as an evolutionary quantitative process in the 
path of industrialization, involving mainly the extension of the existing 
structure of production. However, Rostow’s prediction that foreign investment 
and aid would ensure the economic take-off of developing nations, failed to 
materialize and in time the enthusiasm for the theory began to decline.61  A 
common thread of these development theories was the active role advocated 
for state intervention in the economy in order to generate capital accumulation 
and the necessary investment for industrialization. This was essential, in view 
of the need to adopt new technologies and to preserve high investment and 
saving rates. 
The “big push” theory, advanced by Rosenstein-Rodin in the 1940s, 
further emphasized the role of the State as an ex ante coordinator for 
economic activities.62 The aim of state intervention was to take advantage of 
the increasing returns that could be realized from large-scale planned 
industrialization projects encompassing several major sectors of the economy 
simultaneously. Simultaneous industrialization of many sectors of the 
economy would be profitable on the aggregate, even if it would not be 
individually profitable to industrialize them separately. This “big push” would 
exercise a domino effect on the economy and ensure sustained development. 
Rosenstein-Rodan noted, however, that the market mechanism was not able 
to coordinate the activities needed to ensure this simultaneous 
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industrialization (because of a coordination failure), thus leading to a low 
equilibrium underdevelopment trap.63 He observed that 
“(t)he market mechanism alone will not lead to the creation of social 
overhead capital, which normally accounts for 30 to 35 percent of total 
investment. That must be sponsored, planned, or programmed (usually 
by public investment). To take advantage of external economies (due 
to indivisibilities) require an “optimum size” of enterprise to be brought 
about by a simultaneous planning of several complementary 
industries.”64  
The under-development problem was thus not only caused by the absence of 
capital or technology but also by the lack of coordination of the different 
economic activities. 
Nurske presented another variation of the “big push” thesis: the theory 
of balanced growth.65 He argued that the problem with developing countries is 
their low capital investments capabilities, which affect their productivity levels 
and their overall per capita income, putting them in a “vicious circle of 
poverty.” He was of the view that mere individual capital investment efforts will 
not solve the problem. There is a need for creating a large-scale supply and a 
matching large-scale demand. The market economy is unable to achieve that: 
when an individual business or single industry alone attempts to raise its 
output level by increasing its individual capital investment, it runs the risk of 
not finding a market for its products because of the low level of overall 
average income.66 However, Nurske disagreed with Rosenstein-Rodan on the 
methods used. While Rosenstein-Rodan advocated a centralized solution to 
the development problem, Nurske thought of less interventionist approaches 
to form capital, such as the use of “dynamic fiscal policies” and forced 
savings; he also emphasized the role of entrepreneurs in the development 
process.67 This, coupled with regulations shielding infant industries from 
import competition, would lead to an increase in supply met by a 
corresponding increase in demand. The programme evolved to the Import 
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) programmes, very influential in Latin 
America during the 1950s and 1960s.   
In the 1940s and 1950s a new wave of economic theories emerged to 
challenge neoclassical price theory from structuralists/institutionalists 
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perspectives.68 These heterodox economists did not believe that relatively 
minor changes, such as an increase in foreign aid or a sudden increase in 
investment, would be sufficient to create a “big push” or “take-off” into 
sustained growth. In their view, “such limited changes, in the context of 
existing structures and institutions prevailing in less developing societies, 
might result in strengthening of the backward socio-economic framework, 
consolidating adverse path dependence.”69  
In his work with Hal Singer, Raúl Prebisch was highly skeptical of 
Adam Smith’s belief in the “international division of labor.”70 Prebisch 
distinguished between developed countries and the “periphery”: “[e]conomies 
in the former are self-sustained through technological progress, whereas the 
peripheral ones play the role of row material suppliers for the industrial 
center.”71 The main thrust of the theory was that this center-periphery system 
was marked by a bipolar evolution favoring the technological development of 
the center, while for the periphery technical progress penetrated only to the 
degree that was necessary to generate exports of low-cost foodstuffs and raw 
materials for the markets of the center. Adam Smith’s theory was thus flawed, 
because it was based on the assumption that the two systems are “strictly 
complementary”; this was not the case, since “there are specific differences in 
structure and functions among countries that participate in international 
trade.”72 
Neoclassical price theory was criticized for being disconnected from 
the realities of the periphery, in particular as it did not take into account their 
historical (political, economic and social) background. Prebisch focused on 
the structure of export trade in under-developed economies, highlighting that 
the terms of trade based on comparative advantage put the developing 
societies in a less favorable position than that of the centre, as the long term 
trend of primary commodity prices would be negative.. The Prebisch-Singer 
thesis of export pessimism proposed a solution: ”programmed” 
industrialization via import substitution based on protectionist policies.”73 The 
new policy solution was to pursue a national program of industrialization 
behind protective tariff barriers and the suppression of competition. 
This approach was widely adopted by Latin American countries until 
the 1960s, when it became obvious that it failed to fulfill its promises.However, 
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at a later stage, structuralists shifted their focus to internal political economy 
aspects and the very skewed wealth and income distribution in Latin America 
as a factor blocking development. 
In more recent jargon, even using neoclassical economics, developing 
countries are characterized by non-linearities that originate all kinds of growth 
traps. The first trap to be formulated was Malthus theory of population. 
Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurske and Hirschman formulate traps due to 
externalities that can originate from infrastructure or lack of coordination, and 
there are dozens of theories about all kinds of traps. If the country does not 
overcome the trap it falls back into a low equilibrium level. If it overcomes the 
trap it starts a phase of sustained growth. The work of Banerjee and Dufflo is 
being applied to prove or disprove the existence of these traps.74  
Elsewhere,. , there was considerable appeal in strong state action to 
“catch up” with the advanced Western nations. Beginning with the creation of 
a central planning commission by Nehru in 1950 in India, many other 
developing countries followed suit, believing in the efficiency of a national 
development plan that would determine priorities, set quantitative targets, and 
establish public policies to achieve the desired objectives. Governments of 
emerging nations turned to national planning as if this was a precondition for 
development. Confidence in planning also came from the background 
experience of active state intervention during the Great Depression of the 
interwar period (including import substitution policies in Latin America), the 
role of foreign aid through the Marshall plan after World War II, and the 
example of the Soviet planned industrialization.”75  
This led to the debate between the proponents of “mono-economics,” 
that is the claim that economics consists of principles of universal validity, with 
the proponents of the view that developing countries have particularities that 
require a different kind of economics.76  The concept of the “underdeveloped 
country” that emerged was instrumental in the flourishing of the separate 
discipline of development economics.77 The rejection of the mono-economics 
claim presupposed that underdeveloped countries shared a set of specific 
socio-economic and institutional conditions that set them apart from the 
developed world, thus requiring the adoption of new economic strategies to 
promote development and growth.78 The essence of their claim was that 
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institutional differences between developed and underdeveloped nations 
affected not only the speed, but also the path of economic development. It 
was thus necessary to establish a distinction between the concepts of growth, 
an essentially quantitative process of market expansion, and that of 
development, an inherently qualitative operation of generating a new 
equilibrium. 
Drawing on the history of European industrialisation in the 19th century, 
Gerschenkron provided evidence that the roadmap for development of 
advanced economies was not necessarily applicable to developing 
jurisdictions.79 Gerschenkron argued that features of late industrialization are 
distinctively different from that of the advanced countries80 For him, State 
intervention should compensate for the inadequate supplies of capital, skilled 
labour, entrepreneurship and technological capacity found in backward 
countries. 
A different strand of structuralist literature was the dependency 
theory,81 which argued that peripheral countries provide the center countries 
with the needed inputs and function as markets for their manufactured 
products. As Baran explains, it was the colonial powers that caused the 
underdevelopment of these poor nations. He attributed this result to 
“monopoly capitalism,”82 In his view, based on historical research on 
underdeveloped nations, colonization was the main “source of poverty” for 
developing countries, as it operated to channel their economic surplus.83 The 
center had an inherent interest in maintaining the status quo –the 
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backwardness- of peripheral countries. Dependency was the crux of the 
relationship between the center and the periphery. Baran was skeptical about 
the role foreign aid could play in stimulating development, arguing that 
international monopoly capital would form alliances with pre-capitalist 
domestic oligarchies with the intention to block progressive capitalist 
transformations in the periphery. The operation of multinationals would also 
have the effect of distorting the process of capitalist development in these 
countries. As a result, international monopoly capital would have easy access 
to peripheral resources and finance, and the traditional élites in the periphery 
would be able to maintain their monopoly on power and their traditional 
(mostly predatory and rent-seeking) modes of surplus extraction. This 
theoretical framework was instrumental in the demand for a New International 
Economic Order in the 1970s,84 and the increasing international regulation, 
through codes of conduct, of multinational corporations.85 
China’s success since the reforms of the 1980s proves that 
international trade can act as an engine for growth. The introduction of a 
market economy in the new economic zones, and the massive technological 
transfer that has occurred, accompanied by foreign direct investment, has 
disproved the dependency theory in this case. The use of dynamic 
comparative advantages supported the industrialization process of those 
zones, as low wage labour is supplied in large amounts, as in the Lewis-
Ranis/Fei dual model of development.86  
 
 
B. The Chicago Markets-Oriented Paradigm and the Washington 
Consensus 
 
With the the government leading the development path, the default 
macro-strategies of the post-World War II period included state planning and 
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state ownership of the main industries and banking facilities, import protection 
rules, restrictions on foreign investment, and industrial licensing.87 These 
policies were in direct contradiction to the competition paradigm of the 
neoclassical economics school, hence, leaving almost no room to envisage a 
competition policy under such a state interventionist economic environment. 
The Chicago school’s starting point was different: markets are usually 
efficient, there is no good alternative to the price mechanism, government 
might fail, and the risks of that happening are more important than market 
failures.88 Government intervention resulted in many price distortions in the 
market and provoked enormous allocative inefficiencies, curbing competition 
and increasing rent-seeking activities. Anne Krueger highlighted the perils of 
having a large state sector which created opportunities for rents, hence 
affecting the judgment of the policymaker and turning the society into a rent-
seeking one: “bureaucratic failure” could be worse than “market failure.” 89 On 
the other hand, through the lens of public choice theory, Basu reminds us that 
governments are neither omniscient nor necessarily benevolent.90 Ian M.D. 
Little’s influential study of seven countries with Tibor Scitovsky and Maurice 
Scott, showed that,under import-substitution-strategies (ISI), consumers were 
forced to purchase commodities at a higher price, either imported with large 
surcharges, or produced inefficiently domestically, while unprotected 
industries like agriculture and small and medium enterprises had low relative 
prices and profits were compressed due to high prices of industrial inputs..91 
Authors inspired by the Chicago neoclassical price theory paradigm noted that 
the “dirigist dogma” focused on the macroeconomics of development, ignoring 
the price mechanism and welfare economics altogether;92 furthermore, they 
provided empirical support for the importance of microeconomics in 
development planning.93  
The above criticism of development economics, the subsequent 
financial crises of the 1980s, and the fall of the USSR paved the way for its 
decline. Government failure in steering the development course was 
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unquestionable, leading to another shift in economic policy. Contrasting the 
performance of Latin American countries to East Asian Countries triggered 
scepticism of the “dirigiste” policies and led eventually to the resurgence of 
market economy..94 The recognized success of the Asian Tigers showed that 
an outward policy, based on export promotion, clearly taking advantage of the 
global trade, was far superior than the inward/autarchic policies of Latin 
America.  The other lesson was that a country could develop and industrialize 
even starting from a resource poor economy, by pursuing vigorous policies of 
human capital development and promoting domestic savings. These policies 
proved that the centre-periphery vicious circle could be broken and that export 
promotion allowed a much higher rate of technology transfer and global 
markets discipline acted as a competitive pressure against inefficient 
manufacturing firms.     
The Chicago School provided the required theoretical framework for 
this resurgence. Milton Friedman, one of the most prominent Chicago school 
scholars, argued for  minimal state intervention in the economy and for 
political freedom which can only be achieved through laissez-faire 
capitalism.95 He explained the role markets play in conferring political 
freedom.96  
These policies of protection of property rights, privatization, 
liberalization of markets, and macroeconomic equilibrium became enshrined 
in the Washington Consensus, a testament to the resurgence of mono-
economics as well as the return to orthodox economics.97 The teachings of 
the Chicago School greatly influenced the policies of major international 
organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s.98  The policy 
promoted by these institutions was coined the “Washington Consensus,99 a 
term that later evolved to denote “an extreme and dogmatic commitment to 
the belief that markets can handle everything.”100  The Washington 
Consensus advised protection of property rights, market liberalization, 
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deregulation, privatization, and specific fiscal policies.101 As Joseph Stiglitz 
explained, the Washington Consensus demanded liberalized trade, 
macroeconomic stability, and getting prices right and “once the government 
’got out of the way’ private markets would allocate resources efficiently and 
generate robust growth.”.102 Accordingly, followers of the Washington 
Consensus focused their policy reforms on maximizing efficiencies through 
markets and integrating developing economies into the world economic order.   
The shift in development economics towards more market oriented 
policies and less state intervention paved the way to a less conflict-prone 
position to mainstream welfare economics, and thus to some degree of 
convergence with the theoretical framework of competition law and 
economics. However, the Washington Consensus did not advocate the 
adoption of competition law frameworks, perhaps because of its belief in the 
superior efficiency of the market system. 
 
C. Development Economics Post-Washington Consensus 
 
 The Washington Consensus did not survive the test of time. On the one 
hand, while Latin American countries were ideal students to the Consensus, 
others like China, East Asian countries and India, adopted only some of their 
recommendations. However, they achieved record growth in comparison to 
Latin America.103 The success of the latter put the Consensus in a vulnerable 
position, and many started to question its effectiveness.104  
 Accordingly, toward the end of the 1990s, multilateral agencies and 
policy economists suggested an adjusted approach (the “second-generation”), 
focusing on institutional reform and “good governance.”105 Now the 
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Washington Consensus’s list expanded to include other goals such as 
corporate governance, anti-corruption, flexible labor markets, social safety 
nets and targeted poverty reduction, leading the way to some state 
intervention in the economy.106 Though one cannot deny its merits and 
functionality for some countries at a given point in time, “its recipes were 
neither necessary nor sufficient for successful growth.”107 Shapiro notes that 
the “default policy recommendation is still the market”; however, “the 
emphasis of reform has switched to institutions that will allow the market to 
perform more efficiently.”108 This belief that markets work well only when they 
are founded on a sound institutional background challenged the Washington 
Consensus’s unidimensional focus on deregulation, and highlighted the 
importance of adopting appropriate, market-friendly, regulatory mechanisms, 
such as competition law. 
This new approach is explicit in the final report of the Commission on 
Growth and Development. Released in 2008, the report highlights the 
importance of markets for the development process, but also notes that “the 
task is to improve the effectiveness of government institutions rather than 
stripping them of their tasks.”109 Commenting on the report, Rodrik notes that 
it provides a balanced approach as it does not tip the scale to either “market 
fundamentalism” or “institutional fundamentalism,” thus avoiding easy 
answers like "just let markets work" or "just get governance right." The 
report’s main message is that circumstances of each country are unique, 
hence each should customize its own development plan.110 
The new consensus is that developing countries differ from developed 
countries “by much more than their level of capital – or even their human 
capital,” and that “even a transfer of funds may not have a large effect on 
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economic growth.”111 An important insight of this literature is an evolution in 
the perception of the concept of development. As noted by Hoff and Stiglitz, 
“[…] industrial and developing countries are on different production 
functions and are organized in different ways. Development is no longer 
seen primarily as a process of capital accumulation but rather as a 
process of organizational change.”112  
Economics of information, institutional economics, and the theory of 
coordination problems, depart from the narrow assumptions of neoclassical 
price theory and provide new insights to development economics, offering the 
challenge for a more holistic, historically and culturally aware perspective.113 
In conclusion, the answer to governmental failure is not a full retraction 
and deployment of a market economy. When contemplating a country’s 
development path one needs to understand that there are no given answers 
as both ends of the spectrum –state intervention and free market- come with 
their own limitations. Each country should thus find its own balance. Other 
variables, such as history and culture, also count. In his study on the causes 
of under-performance in continental Europe, Edmund Phelps found that 
various cultural values like competition and workplace attitudes are significant 
in explaining differences in economic performance.114 The institutional context 
does matter. Developing countries do need to devise economic policies that 
serve their special attributes, but there is no consensus as to what these are.  
 
IV. The Emerging New Consensus: Establishing Links Between 
Competition Economics and Development Economics 
 
 Despite the missing links between development economics and 
competition law and economics,, it is important to acknowledge the need for 
the establishment of a sustained dialogue between the two disciplines. This is 
essential in light of the enactment of competition law statutes in several 
developing economies, and the rising levels of competition law enforcement in 
the developing world. However, the two disciplines have made important 
steps towards the creation of a two-way communication system. The 
implementation of competition law and policy has recently attracted attention 
from development economists. Recent competition law and economics 
literature has also focused on the implications of different levels of 
development for the enforcement of an optimal competition law regime. This 
two-way effort of communication is facilitated by the attention both disciplines 
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now pay to institutions and to economic growth. This section will briefly 
examine this argument. 
 
A. Institutions Matter 
 
Economic development cannot be explained simply by using a model 
of a benevolent government that maximizes inter-temporal welfare like most 
of the formal theoretical models assume. In fact, the level of participation in a 
democracy and the type and influence of interest groups differs substantially 
with the level of education and development of a country. Olson has made a 
prominent contribution in the recent theory of political economy models of 
development.115 He applies his well-known theory of collective action116 to 
explain why some countries grow and others stagnate. Olson uses the 
concept of a “distributional coalition,” a group whose collective action can 
secure a larger share of the resources generated by the economy for its 
members at the expense of the population at large. The instruments used to 
redistribute income and wealth to these special interest groups are tax and 
subsidy policies, entry and mobility barriers, and tariffs and quotas on imports, 
among others. Encompassing groups have an incentive to promote growth 
because their interests do not differ substantially from society’s goals. 
In a stable society, distributional coalitions gradually find ways to solve 
their collective action problems. Once they are formed and established, they 
prefer the status quo and are likely to oppose innovations that would increase 
the growth rate of the economy. Thus, coalitions can trap a society into a 
stagnant economic state. In fact, Parente and Prescott have built a formal 
model that captures the idea that insider groups that operate with a given 
technology may oppose the introduction of innovations and thus block 
economic growth.117 The way they usually oppose that change is by using 
monopoly rights like labor regulations coupled with restrictions to enterprise 
entry. In each industry there is a coalition of input suppliers that uses its 
monopoly power to block the access to a superior technology. In their model, 
calibrated with parameters to replicate a typical economy, GDP could be 
multiplied by a factor of 3 if monopoly rights are eliminated. In the Parente and 
Prescott model there is no place for the government, and all the action is 
between the coalition of the status quo and a new coalition that has to bribe 
the first one in order to get into business. 
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A similar model had already been built by Krusell and Rios-Rull in 
which a group that innovates and receives rents creates vested interests that 
oppose the next innovation.118 This generates a cycle of growth and 
stagnation, depending on which group dominates. They let agents use a 
majority vote to choose a policy of regulation or laissez-faire, with young, 
unskilled agents preferring a reduction in costs through innovation, and 
workers with higher levels of human capital interested in maintaining their high 
rents. The setting is very general and the results in terms of ergodic states are 
difficult to interpret and apply in terms of policy, as the authors recognize.  
Grossman and Helpman built a simpler model to explain why there are 
different protection rates in external trade by industries and sectors.119 They 
develop a model in which special-interest groups, organized in lobbies, make 
contributions in order to bias the government choice of trade policy in their 
favor. Politicians maximize a two-part welfare function that depends on the 
contributions collected and the welfare of voters at large because they need 
them for reelection. The need for party financing and particularly campaign 
financing in a democratic state puts the politicians in a position that they put 
out “protection for sale.” The model generates a set of protection rates that 
obey a Ramsey modified rule: protection would be higher in sectors with lower 
import demand and export supply elasticities, and stronger interest groups. 
Mitra extends the work of Grossman and Helpman,120 and shows that a 
greater inequality in income or wealth distribution leads to a higher rate of rent 
extraction from lobbies, thus lowering social welfare. He also shows that more 
concentrated industries with higher capital intensity and inelastic demand 
have stronger lobbies. A test of the protection for sale model by Gawande and 
Bandyopadhyay for the U.S. gives high marks to that theory.121 Ethier 
questions this success.122 
Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti123 also tackle an issue in the line of 
Parente-Prescott124 and Krusell-Rios-Rull:125 a change in policy by the 
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government against vested interests would increase the level of development. 
In their case, this is a change from an investment-based strategy, i.e., a 
strategy where low-quality firms (with low quality entrepreneurs) invest and 
imitate and adopt technologies from more advanced countries, to an 
innovation-based strategy focused on selecting only efficient firms and on 
innovation (approaching the technological frontier). The problem is that the 
vested interests incorporated in the investment-based strategy can buy out 
the political power. Thus, societies are trapped with “inappropriate institutions” 
and relatively backward technologies. The authors find evidence using an 
OECD industry database that shows a positive correlation between “proximity 
to the frontier” (relation between the firm TFP and the firm with the best TFP) 
and R&D intensity.  They also empirically investigate the relationship between 
high barriers to entry/low competition and growth rates across a sample of 
developing countries, and find that high barriers are more harmful to growth 
close to the technological frontier with growth rates slowing as they approach 
it.  
In their model, the authors prove the existence of a dynamic 
equilibrium and the possible occurrence of a political economy trap where 
capitalists bribe the government in order to maintain a regime of monopoly 
rents with low competition, blocking growth over the long-term. Such a trap is 
more likely in societies with weak institutions (more corruptible). The model 
also suggests that there may be a need for more government intervention at 
the beginning of a nation’s development in order to solve coordination 
problems. However, the country ultimately must switch to a more competitive 
environment in order to approach the technological frontier, though this may 
be difficult due to the capture of politicians by groups that benefited from the 
initial interventions. Cases like Brazil, Mexico and Peru come to mind, when 
contrasted with some East Asian economies like Hong Kong and Singapore. 
These studies emphasize the role of competition in the process of building 
stronger institutions for growth. 
Another strand of the literature that is relevant to this study links 
competition, rents and corruption. Andes and di Tella build a model of 
compensation and corruption for government agencies.126 They claim, in the 
spirit of Gary Becker and George Stigler, that when the principal (the people) 
pursues multiple and diffuse objectives, state contingent contracts with the 
agent (government) are hard to write and rents have to be allocated to 
enhance performance.127 The authors deal with a similar problem, but 
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between another principal (government) and agent (bureaucracy). They use 
an efficiency wage theory to determine the optimal level of corruption. When a 
firm under the influence of a bureaucrat enjoys rents, the value of his control 
rights is high. Bureaucrats can trade part of this control in exchange for 
bribes. In a regime of monopolies there would be a higher level of corruption 
when compared with a more competitive world. The public (citizenry) would 
incur greater losses if they were to try to redefine the contracts with the 
bureaucrats or spend more resources controlling corruption. The problem with 
this approach is that they disregard the Olsonian view that large groups have 
difficulty in coordinating their actions, while the monopolists form a small 
group benefiting from high rents.  
Although these models have certainly helped illuminate the interaction 
between political parties, governments, and vested interests, there are still 
unanswered questions. What is the role of political competition and the party 
system in development? What is the role of checks and balances on the 
decisions of the government? In models of protection for sale, how much 
power do interest groups have in comparison to specific institutions, such as 
competition authorities that promote social welfare? Their respective power 
depends on the institutional development of each jurisdiction and the relevant 
political constraints: it depends on how mature a democracy is, the balance of 
powers between branches of government, the level of control by institutions of 
corruption and the influence of economic interests in the political process. The 
political process is thus endogenous and should be taken into account. 
Contrary to Chicago economists who believe that neither institutions nor 
wealth distribution matter for efficiency, new theories of economic 
development argue that distribution of wealth matters: “if the distribution of 
wealth is so unequal that some individuals have more than enough wealth to 
put their skills to best use while others have so little wealth that they cannot 
even obtain credit to undertake a productive project, the catalytic role of 
wealth will be limited,” Hoff and Stiglitz remark, noting also that “[…] the 
welfare of any single agent depends, in general, on the entire distribution of 
wealth.”128 The common thread in this literature is the role of coordination 
failures, such as rent-seeking, inefficient institutions (formal and informal), and 
underinvestment in research and education. in developing nations. This 
provides a richer picture than the government failure paradigms’ exclusive 
focus on governmental explanation of under-development, thus initiating a 
“major shift in focus and in conclusions from neoclassical models”129. 
Competition and industrial organization scholars also argue for the 
positive correlation between development and competition, and the 
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importance of institutions for an optimal enforcement of competition law.130 
The role of competition law in development is linked to the prevailing 
economic policy: the greater the government intervention, the less significant 
competition law is and vice versa. Thus, competition law has only featured in 
development economics fairly recently.131 The discussion has now moved to 
examine the kind of competition policy and law that would be suitable for 
developing economies.132 There is almost a consensus that these 
policies/laws must account for the “special attributes” of developing countries, 
thus rejecting a mere transplantation of competition laws from developed 
countries.133 Gall discusses the preconditions of enforcement of competition 
law in developing countries, noting that the challenges facing developing 
countries, such as a low level of economic development, institutional design 
problems, and complex governmental regulation and bureaucracy, create 
real-world challenges which should be taken into account in the early stages 
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of the adoption of competition law,134 thus warning against a copy and paste 
approach.135 Fox suggests six different models (including the US and EU 
model) for developing countries to choose from, noting that what is important 
is the “knowledgeable choice.”136 Singh asserts the significance for 
developing countries of having a competition policy that takes into 
consideration their level of development, in conjunction with the objective of 
long-term sustainable economic growth.137 He further asserts the urgent need 
for competition policy to accompany the privatization process and safeguard 
the interests of developing jurisdictions, in the global merger wave.138 There is 
an increasing consensus that jurisdictions at different levels of development 
and governance capacities require different types of competition policies than 
that of developed ones.139 In a recent cross-country study using a sample of 
101 countries, Ma shows that until a country reaches a certain threshold of 
institutional development, competition law will be idle: it is clear that in the 
least developed jurisdictions, competition law will have no effect on the 
country’s economic growth. Once that threshold is reached, without an 
“efficient enforcement scheme,” competition law may have an adverse effect 
on growth.140 Along the same lines, Fox and Mateus advocate a targeted 
application of competition law for practices that have a significant impact on 
the most vulnerable, the poor.141  
 
B. The Common Emphasis on Growth 
 
The new theory of endogenous growth pioneered by Romer,142 picks 
up on the “specialization” idea of Smith-Ricardo and shows how growth could 
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ensue from that process. There are two strands in this literature. The first is 
that Research and Development (R&D) expands the number of available 
inputs for production and thus increases the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
because of the spillover effects due to the accumulation of knowledge. The 
second is based on product innovation and not process innovation, as the 
economy generates more products. In all these cases, monopoly profits for 
innovators and patent protection play a major role, with competition prevailing 
in the rest of the economy. However, as we will see below, models where 
technological growth takes the form of a “quality ladder” can generate richer 
structures and bring competition to the fore of growth.  
The main link in today’s Industrial Organization models between 
competition and growth is the relation between competition and dynamic 
efficiency.143 The earliest Schumpeterian models predicted that, through the 
operation of the appropriability effect, competition reduces the prospective 
monopoly rents spurring innovation and therefore growth. New models insist 
on the non-linear relationship between competition and growth: although the 
increase in the intensity of competition will tend to reduce the level of profits of 
a successful innovator, it will reduce the profits of an unsuccessful innovator 
even more, thus having an overall positive effect on the rate of innovation.144 
The management of the firm will be also forced to innovate more.145 There are 
generally four channels that have been corroborated empirically.  
First, competition creates a larger number of opportunities for 
benchmarking, so the market can monitor firm management.146 Second, 
innovations tend to increase productivity and reduce costs, thereby generating 
a higher level of profits in a competitive environment where demand price 
elasticities are higher. Third, higher levels of competition increase the 
probability of failure which is an incentive for management to be more 
efficient.147 Fourth, because workers share in rents, higher competition also 
leads to a higher productive effort.148  
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The Schumpeterian models arguing that monopolies are necessary to 
generate innovation149 are not only misleading, but are also subject to 
contradictions. Both Aghion and Howitt,150 and Grossman and Helpman151 
have produced models showing that firms that innovative are new entrants 
that had zero profits before entering the market. Where are the deep pockets 
of money to finance R&D? The Schumpeterian models also assume that all 
firms have access to the same R&D technology and enter the market with the 
same productivity, which is contradicted by the large distribution of 
productivity and costs among firms, even in the same industry.  Focusing on 
the different channels through which competition influences innovation, we 
can distinguish, among others: (i) The Darwinian effect introduced by 
Aghion152 and Porter;153 (ii) the “neck-and-neck” effect;154 (iii) the Arrow 
effect;155 and (iv) the mobility effect.156   
Second, competition may lower the pre-innovation rents by more than 
post-innovation rents, and increase the after innovation profits, especially for 
new low-cost firms in oligopolies with not too dissimilar firms, thus eliminating 
the Schumpeterian effect. Empirical evidence on patents and other intellectual 
property rights shows that the impact of patenting is only beneficial in some 
intensive R&D subsectors, like pharmaceuticals or heavy chemicals. In these 
cases, the Schumpeterian effect is important as there are industries with very 
unequal firms in terms of costs, and the laggards have to catch-up to the 
technological leader before innovating. These two cases may lead to the 
empirical finding of a U curve by Aghion et al.,157 relating market structure to 
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innovation.158 There is now important empirical evidence that competition is 
linked to growth in developed countries. Disney et al. conclude that 
competition increases productivity levels and the rate of growth of 
productivity.159 Bloom and van Reenen’s empirical research concludes that 
good management practices, which improve as competition increases, are 
strongly associated with productivity.160. 
Finally, an efficient market for corporate control with open rules for 
takeovers reinforces the impact of competition on productivity.161  
Research in developing countries has also shown the importance of 
the link between competition and growth. Dutz and Hayri find in a cross-
country model explaining growth rates, that competition policy has a positive 
impact on growth, even after taking into consideration trade and institutional 
policies.162 Reviewing a large number of studies in the 1990s, Tybout 
concluded that there is evidence that protection increases price-cost margins 
and reduces efficiency at the margin, and that exporters (firms that succeed in 
the international market), are more efficient than non-exporters.163 Using a 
new data set for Latin America, Haltiwanger et al. confirm that trade 
liberalization and competition leads to higher levels of efficiency at the firm 
level and also to reallocation of resources to more productive sectors.164 
Using data for Colombia, Eslava et al. show that trade and financial reforms of 
the 1990s were associated with productivity increases resulting in reallocation 
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from low to high productivity firms.165 Similar evidence has been shown for 
Chile due to trade liberalization166 and for India due to the elimination of the 
Raj licensing scheme.167 Aghion et al. provide evidence that increasing 
competition in South Africa manufacturing should have “large productivity 
effects.”168 Carlin et al. have been researching the relative importance of 
infrastructure and competition in transition countries, using survey data, and 
have found some evidence that institutions and competition play a distinctive 
role in growth beyond their impact on innovation.169.Using Schumpeterian 
growth theory, Grossman and Helpman show that strengthening patent 
protection in the South will weaken the incentive to perform R&D in the North 
as fewer products get imitated, thereby causing labor in the North to move 
from R&D to manufacturing.170 
On the reverse causation side, Aghion and Schenkerman find that 
countries can find themselves in a competition trap that blocks growth171. 
Countries most vulnerable are those in which the initial level of competition is 
low, the initial degree of cost asymmetry among firms is low and politicians 
are less driven by social welfare concerns. They also show that the old 
Schumpeterian result that an increase in market competition intensifies ex 
post competition, reduces post-entry rents and thus discourages entry, breaks 
down. With cost asymmetry and selection considerations they get the inverse 
result, because more competition encourages the entry of low-cost firms. 
According to Jenny, the characteristics of developing countries pose 
particular challenges to competition policies and antitrust enforcement.172 
Most are small economies with high levels of enterprise concentration, and 
regionally- or locally-segmented markets with high barriers to entry. These 
barriers may result from poor transportation and telecommunication 
infrastructure, the monopolistic behavior of operators of essential facilities, or 
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trade barriers, among others. Markets are also small because of the low 
income level and limited consumer demand, as well as a small industrial 
base. Economic theory would thus predict that those economies are prone to 
anticompetitive structures, behavior and transactions.  
It follows that, since development is a dynamic process of entry, and 
competition is central to productivity increases and innovation, competition 
policies should equally as important as other major development policies. 
International organizations, when advising on economic policies or setting 
conditionality for loans for development aid, are well-advised to take this 
route, which has heretofore been almost completely neglected. Examples 
abound of privatizations that have turned public monopolies into private ones, 
or trade liberalization that was barred due to problems of concentration in the 
import sector. As UNCTAD recognizes, competition policies are essential for 
development, and competition law is only one of the areas of these policies.173 
The general promotion of competition in the economy requires a broad 
spectrum of measures and instruments, for example in fields of trade policy 
and public procurement. To be successful, competition policies have to be 
embraced at the highest level of government, rather than relegated to a 
specific agency. They have to permeate all policies of the government and be 
part of a culture practiced by the executive, legislative and judicial branches. It 
is thus crucial to establish a continuous conversation between competition 
scholars and development economists. The seclusion of antitrust 
(competition) law and economics from the macro-economic level should end. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The preceding analysis has brought to the fore the limitations of traditional 
approaches. Development economics of the 1950s relied on an all-pervasive 
state intervention to start growth and industrialize, substituted market 
allocations by planning mechanisms and external protection. History has 
shown that governments and administrations do not have enough information 
(and required economic knowledge), and agents may lack adequate 
incentives, introducing large distortions and wasting a large amount of 
resources. But it has also been shown that the idea of a benevolent 
government acting to maximize welfare is far removed from the reality of 
developing countries – governments are too often captured by large interest 
groups and corruption may be rampant, so their actions and policies may 
instead block economic growth. By emphasizing markets the recent economic 
theory was not only reintroducing the role of the price mechanism and market 
incentives but also trying to limit government intervention in general. What 
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experience has shown is that this is a chimeric approach: by simply containing 
government intervention, governance issues will not be resolved. Democratic 
reforms may contribute to solve part of the problem, but its sustainability is 
sometimes threatened by entrenched power. 
The rebalancing that occurred after the 1990s towards a more eclectic 
economic and institutional approach and also a more “clinical” approach 
suited for each country, abandoning all-country recipes, may be more 
productive. Moreover, recent empirical research174 has also shown that we 
have to be more humble not only on the questions we ask but also on what 
we may achieve with development policies. E.g. we should not expect that 
external aid would solve most of the development problem (like Sachs) or to 
declare overall foreign aid ineffectiveness (like Easterly), but ask under what 
limited conditions aid may contribute to solve a particular health, education or 
infrastructure problem. Within this more limited agenda we think competition 
policy can contribute to improve market efficiency and also for some cases of 
poverty alleviation. 
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